According to the Army's own documents, the Army is facing a $7 billion budget shortfall per year without continuing supplemental funding. It already has guarantees from congress for an additional $5 billion per year for the modularity plan for the years FY-07 through FY-11, but as the Global War on Terrorism continues and the Operational Tempo for the Army remains high, the requirements for additional funding will also remain high. Without additional funding, the impact on the Army will be enormous. This paper will examine the impact on the Army if congressional supplemental funding stops. Specifically, if the current Army demands remain constant for the foreseeable future, this paper will explore the possible ramifications on the Army modularity process, and the Future Combat System (FCS) if the supplemental funding stops or is significantly reduced.
THE IMPACT ON ARMY TRANSFORMATION IF SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDING WANES
My sympathy often goes out for the humble decimal point. He has a pathetic and hectic life wandering around among regimented ciphers, trying to find some of the old places he used to know when budgets were balanced.
-Herbert Hoover
Top Army leaders realize that they have a window of opportunity to transform, but as the federal deficit continues to grow, funding Army transformation will face increasing pressure. At the Association of the United States Army Winter conference in Washington, GEN Schoomaker, current Chief of Staff of the Army stated, "We're in a hurry to get this transformation done because there's only a fleeting opportunity to do it." He went on to say that because of budgetary pressure, "I don't know how long it (congressional support) will be there." According to the Army's own documents, the Army is facing a $7 billion budget shortfall per year without continuing supplemental funding. 2 The Army's budget for 2004 was $140 billion dollars which includes $38.7 in supplemental appropriations. 3 The Army's budget for 2005 was $98.9 billion yet total spending with supplemental appropriations was $115 billion. 4 As can be seen from these examples, it is readily apparent the Army needs supplemental funding. It already has guarantees from congress for an additional $5 billion per year for the modularity plan for the years FY-07 through FY-11, but as the Global War on Terrorism continues and the Operational Tempo for the Army remains high, the requirements for additional funding will also remain high. Just paying for the Presidentially authorized active component level of 512,400
personnel, (up from the 482,400 funded level) will cost the Army $3 billion per year that is not included in the current budget. Without additional funding, the impact on the Army will be enormous. This paper will examine the impact on the Army if congressional supplemental funding stops or is significantly reduced. Specifically, if the current Army demands remain constant for the foreseeable future, this paper will explore the possible ramifications if the supplemental funding stops on the Army modularity process, and the Future Combat System (FCS).
As shown in agenda of multiple rounds of tax cuts, the new Medicare prescription drug benefit, and a budgetbusting highway bill will add trillions more to the national debt, which must be covered by more government borrowing, thus putting the U.S. economy at risk. In addition, foreign investorswhich hold 43% of our national debt -are now in a position of power.
8 Any sign of financial crisis here at home could precipitate further distress if foreign investors demand their due. The resulting pressure on the dollar would squeeze the nation's ability to meet its most pressing needs, putting national security at risk. These factors may well force Congress and the Administration to take a hard look at the current federal budget and see where cuts can be made.
It is generally agreed that there are three "core" national interests of vital importance:
promotion of values, physical security, and economic prosperity. 9 These objectives (ends) are accomplished in several ways and nations use all elements of national power to achieve them.
Elements of national power include: military, intelligence, diplomacy, law enforcement, information, financial, and economic components. Of all the elements of national power, the financial element is most at risk. Because the financial element of power deals with both monetary policy and fiscal policy, continued deficit spending and subsequent government borrowing will require massive changes to the current U.S. fiscal policy -both domestically and abroad. Persistently large federal deficits can erode the growth of future living standards for Americans and severely degrade the United States' economic performance. Unless immediate changes are made concerning U.S. fiscal policy, the swelling national debt will not only limit the use of the financial element of power as a tool of national security policy, but also jeopardize the U.S. economy and the ability to fund other instruments of national power, in particular the military. The graph below demonstrates how the national debt has grown over time. To be sure, a lot has happened to require increased spending, much of it with huge price tags: two hurricanes, the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, homeland security needs, and other military operations. While the status quo is an option, for all of the reasons above, it is not preferable.
As mentioned earlier, the financial element of national power typically deals with two main areas: fiscal policy and monetary policy. Fiscal policy is an economic term that describes the behavior of governments to raise money to fund current spending and investment for collective social purposes and for the transfer of payments to citizens. The money is raised through taxation, by borrowing, by charging for services that the government performs, and as a charge on social assets such as private property. 10 It can also include temporary deficit spending to stimulate demand for domestic goods and services (e.g. to fight unemployment) or cut deficits to raise a budget surplus (to fight inflation).
11
Monetary policy is the process of managing the money supply to achieve specific goals such as constraining inflation, achieving full employment, or economic growth. It can also involve changing certain interest rates, either directly or indirectly through open market operations, exchange rates, and setting reserve requirements for federally chartered banks.
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Of the two components, fiscal policy provides more leverage. Our ability to use the financial element as a tool of national security policy and to fund the other elements of national power 
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So what are the options to deal with current deficit spending? The core national interest is economic prosperity both at home and abroad. To accomplish this, the U.S. uses the finance element of national power. One option, of course, is the status quo, but doing so is dangerously irresponsible. While short-term deficit spending is certainly feasible, it is used most often in times of recession. A careful evaluation of this option shows that the current fiscal policy of deficit spending is neither acceptable nor suitable. Federal deficits reduce living standards by slowing the accumulation of national wealth as they lower the national savings rate. This puts future living standards at risk which, in turn, degrades economic performance. The second-andthird order effects are higher interest rates, and lower stock market values. Deficits can also lower labor productivity by reducing direct investment. 13 In addition, the nation's ability to fund the other elements of national power is also greatly reduced. At best, continued deficit spending at the current levels will harm the future of Americans. At worst, it could trigger a fiscal crisis, which could accelerate and quite possibly worsen the damage. In terms of intensity of interests (vital/important/peripheral), it is vitally important that the U.S. achieve the goal of economic prosperity both at home and abroad. Unfortunately, the current fiscal path of the United States is not sustainable. Hard budgetary choices have to be made and changes implemented.
But can those changes be incremental or do wholesale modifications have to be made to the current fiscal policy? If the endstate remains the same, economic prosperity and a functioning financial element of power, a second option may be to do small incremental changes to fiscal policy. The means to do that are slowing the growth of Medicare, and raising the Social Security retirement eligibility age (again) for starters. Under reasonable projections, the budget deficit will continue to grow at about 3.5% of GDP over the next few years. Thereafter, as the baby boomer generation grows older and health and retirement costs mount, deficits are likely to grow much larger. 14 Add to this the increases in life expectancy, continued growth in health care costs, and the fact that health-related programs are much more difficult to reform than other social programs, this option is not sustainable either. Indeed, mandatory spending has grown to consume nearly 57% of the federal budget. Add to that the interest on the debt that must be repaid and the mandatory portion grows to 63% leaving little room for budgetary maneuver. Clearly, the budget outlook for this option is dismal and -like the first option -put the future of Americans and the economy at risk. See figure 2 below. Medicaid. 15 At the very least, policy changes to slow the growth of social programs and entitlements, especially health care costs, to reduce government outlays could be targeted. As is the case above, this may not be acceptable because of both public and Congressional support. The likely target for the reductions will be discretionary spending and the largest part of discretionary spending is the Department of Defense (DOD) portion.
Outlays for Major Spending
Members of Congress are already beginning to ask, "What offsets within the DOD share of the budget can be made to fund current expenses?" What weapon systems are truly critical?
What are, in fact, the true expenses for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)? For example, the GWOT up to this point has been funded with supplemental appropriations that include other costs such as the multi-million dollar embassy in Iraq. If a strong economy and future economic prosperity are the desired objective, these and other hard questions are going to have to be debated and hard decisions made.
Significant changes in fiscal policy are needed to preemptively deal with the deficit spending and the associated risk of fiscal crisis. We cannot continue down the same road to financial insecurity that we are on now. At best, these deficits will gradually harm the income of A process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation through new combinations of concepts, capabilities, people, and organizations that exploit our nation's advantages and protects against our asymmetric vulnerabilities to sustain our strategic position, which helps underpin peace and stability in the world.
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From Rumsfeld's perspective, transformation is not just embracing new technology and acquiring new equipment. It also seeks to leverage those technologies and develop new concepts to create and sustain an operational advantage against our current enemies and potential future adversaries. It is an all encompassing process that seeks to change the way the Department thinks and make it more creative. This creative thinking will allow the Department to work better together within itself, with other agencies, and with coalition forces. 18 It seeks not only to improve interagency coordination, but also to improve coordination at all levels of government, (federal, state, and local). Lastly, it is also defined as a process with no end state.
There is no foreseeable point in the future when the Secretary can say that transformation is complete. Those charged with the transformation process are responsible for seeing that it continues indefinitely. 19 In the past, defense transformation has been defined in terms of more discreet, easily identifiable periods in time. This is especially true for the U. S. Army. Army transformation has "three components: the transformation of Army culture, the transformation of processes -risk adjudication using the Current to Future Force construct, and the development of inherently joint transformational capabilities." 22 From this "transformation,"
the Army expects to become more modular in nature, more lethal and deployable (expeditionary). GEN Schoomaker, somewhat jokingly stated that transformation is like" tuning a car engine while the engine is running, which is not only a complex task, but, as you know, it could be dangerous as well." 23 As stated earlier, the two main components of transformation are The Modular Force and the Future Combat System (FCS). This conversion to the Modular Force is described as making the Army more brigade-centric as opposed to division-centric. This will allow for more "plug-inplay" versatility at the brigade level. The Future Combat System (FCS) is the other component the Army is betting on. It is defined as:
(The) FCS is the Army's modernization program consisting of a family of manned and unmanned systems, connected by a common network, that enables the modular force, providing our Soldiers and leaders with leading-edge technologies and capabilities allowing them to dominate in complex environments.
It is a joint (across all the military services) networked (connected via advanced communications) system of systems (one large system made up of 18 individual systems, the network, and most importantly, the Soldier) connected via an advanced network architecture that will enable levels of joint connectivity, situational awareness and understanding, and synchronized operations heretofore unachievable. 24 In short, a Future Combat System-equipped force is a critical capability that is crucial to 30 To achieve this, the Army is also authorized an additional 30,000 soldiers which are not budgeted. It is estimated that these personnel costs will be approximately $3 billion per year. 31 These costs are being paid through supplemental funding as well. The stationing of Brigade Combats Teams is reflected in Figure 3 below.
FIGURE 3. BRIGADE COMBAT TEAM STATIONING
By combining the Future Combat System with the modularization of Army forces (along with cultural changes) the Army hopes to "transform" itself.
Some argue that if carried through to fruition, this will be one of the few times in recent history the U.S. Army has truly transformed itself successfully. GEN Schoomaker has publicly stated that that "we're making some of the most significant changes in our Army we have made since World War II." 32 In reality, the Army has undergone five significant changes since the early years of WWII. Three are generally seen as successful, one is not, and it is too early to discern the results of the current transformation. 33 The first transformation began in 1939 as a result of the strategic vision of GEN Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army. 34 The infantry division of that period had foot, animal, and motor units, all with varying rates of speed, which did not meet the demands of modern warfare.
Seeing that the Army was woefully ill-trained and undermanned for the probable entry of the United States into WWII, GEN Marshall saw to it that the Army received the support, resources, training, and manpower need to be successful. Out this transformation was a brand new branch -armor -and doctrinal changes for its employment.
The second transformation occurred right after the Vietnam War. 35 The divisiveness of the war politically and socially as well as personnel polices in place at the time all contributed to the deterioration of the professional Army. So, more than anything else, the Army focused on its people during this transformational period. 36 It shifted resources and talent to the education and training of its non-commissioned officer corps. Out of this transformation the officer doctrinal education system was revamped and that leaders at all levels were trained and proficient in their respective branches and specialties. 37 The third transformation occurred in the early seventies as a result of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973. 38 Because of the near disastrous Israeli defeat in the early days of the conflict, it became apparent to senior Army leadership that doctrinal changes where needed. The near defeat illustrated that an attack launched by surprise with the new weapon systems available, the "Active Defense" concept the Army had adopted may not be feasible. 39 As result of this, the The fourth attempt to transform was a dismal failure. The Pentomic Division of the 1950s was a result of the Eisenhower administration's belief that the Army was inadequate to prevent a war and certainly could not win one. 41 The common belief at the time was that the next war would be a nuclear one. The Army, in order to remain relevant (and to gain budget dollars), designed the "Pentomic" Division. In the Pentomic Division, five small "Battle Groups" replaced the three infantry regiments. 42 While the smaller battle groups were seen as more effective organizations to operate on a widely dispersed nuclear battlefield, there were other reasons for the Army's adoption of the new structure. The Pentomic Division (with nuclear artillery) became a means by which the Army could stake a claim to a share of the nuclear arsenal. It achieved that goal, but proved ill-suited for the requirements of the conventional battlefield. Lack of support from key Army leaders prevented resources from reaching critical components of the design (such as command and control equipment) 43 and ultimately contributed to the failure of the Pentomic design.
The constant in all three instances of where transformation was a success is that it was resource dependent and widely supported -both inside and outside the Army. Given the costs involved with the latest transformation, the Army may have to scale down its ambitions. It initially which they have to be ready for. 44 That progression (It is depicted below in FIGURE 4) is known as the operational readiness cycle. Different units will be ready for different missions. Perhaps the biggest change is that all units will not have to be ready for war at all times as in the past.
The Army will change from "tiered" readiness to "cyclical" readiness. Furthermore, ARFORGEN recognizes that units will have to build up their readiness over time to meet specific demands.
They do this as they progress through the readiness cycle. All units will be grouped into one of these force pools. The ARFORGEN readiness model is design so that active component (AC)
units spend one year deployed out of every three. Reserve component (RC) units will spend one year deployed out of every five or six years.
Of significance is that for the first time, using ARFORGEN, the Army is able to gather and present comprehensive data on unit readiness and potential combat effectiveness for a The Air Force is already looking at deep cuts in its active and reserve forces to secure savings to offset weapon purchases. The Army is exploring a modest slowdown in the Presidentially authorized increase in troops to protect high-end weaponry. 46 By the Army's own estimates, the cost of maintaining 10,000 soldiers in uniform is approximately $1.5 billion per year. An all too common approach to costly weapons systems is to allow their development and fielding to slip into the out years as funding decreases. This is one way to keep prized programs alive under budgetary pressures.
Another option is to restructure the total force. By eliminating reserve components billets the Army frees up resources to grow the active component, and, of course, the reverse is an option as well. The reserve component -especially the Army Reserve -has traditionally been the preferred place to put highly skilled, low peacetime demand capabilities (i.e. doctors, dentist, and lawyers). The Army is already in the process of migrating some high-demand units from the reserve components to the active component.
Lastly, another option would be to spin out only select portions of the FCS and only field a portion of the force with these capabilities. Given the likelihood of severe budgetary pressure, this is highly probable. If budget cuts force the Army to terminate the entire project, it will more than likely keep proven technologies in place and cease development of the remainder.
Likely Outcome
The With current projection's standing at $128 billion -thus making it the Pentagon's second most costly project, the Future Combat System and indeed Army Transformation are at risk. With the costs of mandatory spending continuing to rise as larger segments of our citizens reach retirement age, discretionary spending will only continue to shrink of which the Pentagon's portion is the largest. With the fight in Iraq, natural disasters here at home, and waning support for the supplemental bills, the Army could find its largest procurement project, the Future Combat System, a likely target for those wanting to balance the budget. Just where the budget ax will fall is yet to be seen.
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